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The Referrals Committee, Mr Justice Peter Kelly (Chair), Mr Martin P O’Donnell and Mr John McGuire convened at the offices of the Irish Horseracing Regulatory Board on Monday, 15 December to consider the referral of Charles Byrnes (Trainer) and Philip Byrnes (Rider) following the Wexford Claiming Hurdle at Wexford on 28 May 2025.
Following the running of the Wexford Claiming Hurdle at Wexford on 28 May 2025, the running and riding of Redwood Queen, trained by Charles Byrnes and ridden by Philip Byrnes, was referred to the Referrals Committee by a Senior Racing Official under the provisions of Rule 27 to consider if a breach of Rule 212 or Rule 272(i) had occurred.
At the referral hearing evidence was heard from Mr Philip Byrnes (Rider), Mr Paul Murtagh, IHRB Head of Raceday Operations, Mr Aidan Connolly, CEO IDIRO Analytics, Mr David Cleary, Independent Handicapping Ombudsman British Horseracing Authority, Mr Liam Walsh, IHRB Senior Stipendiary Steward, Mr Leighton Aspell, IHRB Stipendiary Steward, Mr John Watson, expert witness, Mr David Russell, expert witness.
The case was presented by Mr Remy Farrell SC, Ms Louise Troy BL, instructed by Ms Christine Traynor, IHRB Head of Racing Regulation and Integrity. Mr Charles Byrnes and Mr Philip Byrnes were represented by Mr Frank Crean SC, Mr David Geoghegan BL, instructed by Mr Kevin Power of Maurice Power Solicitors, Kilmallock, County Limerick.
Having considered the evidence, Mr Justice Peter Kelly issued the following written decision on behalf of the Referrals Committee on Thursday 5 February.
DECISION
The Incident
This case arises out of an incident which occurred during the running of the 16:55, Claiming Hurdle at Wexford on 28 May 2025.
On that occasion, the first Respondent, Mr Philip Byrnes (the jockey) was riding a horse called Redwood Queen (the horse). The horse was trained by the second Respondent, Mr Charles Byrnes (the trainer).
The horse was in the lead and well ahead of its nearest rival as the last hurdle in the race was approached. As the jockey himself said in evidence, he "had the race in the bag". But it was not to be. Immediately after jumping the final hurdle, the jockey was unseated from his mount. That incident has given rise to this referral.
Alleged Breaches of the Rules of Racing (the Rules)
The Irish Horseracing Regulatory Board (IHRB) alleges that the jockey is guilty of three Rule breaches. The allegations are as follows.
Rule 212
It is alleged that the jockey, as the rider of the horse in the race, failed in his obligation to ensure that the horse ran on its merits and was also seen, to a reasonable and informed member of the racing public, to have been run on its merits, in that he deliberately left the saddle immediately after the horse jumped the final hurdle.
Rule 212A(i)
It is alleged that the jockey deliberately caused and/or permitted the horse to run other than on its merits, in that he left the saddle immediately after the horse jumped the final hurdle.
Rule 272(i)
It is alleged that the jockey deliberately caused and/or permitted the horse to run other than on its merits, in that he left the saddle immediately after the horse jumped the final hurdle, thereby acting in a manner which was prejudicial to the integrity, proper conduct and good reputation of horse racing.
Rule 272
There is a single charge levelled against the trainer. It does not arise directly out of the running of the race, but rather concerns something which occurred thereafter.
The allegation is that the trainer made a public statement to the Irish Field, published on 30 May, 2025 in the following terms.
"It's a sad day if the Turf Club has to hold an investigation to please the faceless people on social media. We will answer any questions they have. We have nothing to answer to."
It is alleged that that statement was prejudicial to the integrity, proper or good reputation of horseracing insofar as it sought to undermine the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the running of the horse in the race by suggesting, "that there was no real basis for same or that same was being conducted for an improper purpose".
Events post the incident
The Raceday Stewards' report recorded that the incident was reviewed, but no Stewards' Enquiry was convened. That, however, was not the end of the matter. On the following day, 29 May, 2025, the IHRB, acting through Mr Paul Murtagh, its Head of Raceday Operations, quite properly in our view, commenced an investigation as authorised under the Rules. Mr Murtagh gave evidence before us and set out all of the steps which were taken to assemble all relevant medical, veterinary, stewarding, betting, video and testimonial evidence, as well as submissions made on behalf of the jockey and trainer. Part of that investigation involved an interview which was conducted with the jockey by Mr Murtagh and Ms Christine Traynor, the Head of Racing Regulation and Integrity at IHRB, in the presence of the jockey's then solicitors. That interview took place on the afternoon of 19 August, 2025.
On completion of the investigation, the allegations in suit were made and the formal referral to this Committee took place.
The Hearing
The hearing was originally scheduled for two days. However, at the request of the parties, that was reduced to a single day, with an indication from them that that would be sufficient to deal with the matter in its entirety. In the event it was possible to do so, but only by sitting from 9.30am until 7.45pm, with an hour's break for lunch. During that time, we heard evidence from eight witnesses, legal submissions and viewed the incident on countless occasions. That included video, slow motion video, freeze framed pictures and still photographs of the incident and the race.
At the outset of the hearing, a number of legal issues were raised by counsel for the jockey and the trainer, and these had to be ruled upon before the hearing proper could commence. We gave those rulings extempore with short reasons stated for our conclusions. We undertook to elaborate on those reasons which we now do.
Expert witness
Prior to the hearing, the IHRB furnished a book of documents to the Respondents. It included a number of witness statements. Some of those witnesses expressed views in relation to the manner in which the jockey rode and was unseated. Immediately prior to the hearing, however, the IHRB gave notice of its intention to call just one expert to deal with that topic. That witness is Mr Leighton Aspell (Mr Aspell).
Mr Aspell is a man of undoubted knowledge, experience and expertise of horsemanship and racing. He rode from 1993 to 2020, some 27 years. During that time he rode approximately 950 winners in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Europe. He won the Aintree Grand National in 2014 and 2015, the Welsh National in 2002 and 2005, the Hennessy Gold Cup in 2014, to mention but some of his achievements. He began life as an apprentice flat jockey, then moved to National Hunt, and he is also a qualified jockey coach in Ireland and the United Kingdom. He has experience of working with riders on balance, technique and race riding decisions. He is employed by the IHRB, as a Stipendiary Steward. It is that employment by the IHRB which formed the basis for the objection made by the Respondents to the admissibility of his evidence.
Very sensibly, the Respondents accepted that because of his knowledge and experience Mr Aspell had all the necessary qualification to be regarded as an expert. But they said that because he is in the employment of the IHRB, his evidence ought to be ruled out at the very outset and not heard.
Counsel for the Respondents accepted that he could not point to any case in this jurisdiction where an application of this sort had ever been made, let alone made successfully. They accepted that courts generally consider that the question of independence and impartiality of an expert witness are only relevant in considering the weight to be attached to such testimony. They contended that all that had changed as a result in particular, of the judgment of Collins J. in a case called Duffy v. McGee (2022) IECA 254.
Before considering that decision, it is appropriate to consider the legal constraints under which this Committee operates. Its jurisdiction is derived exclusively from the Rules.
Rule 19 (6)(vii), gives us authority to decide, "on the admissibility, relevance and weight of any evidence (including the testimony of any factual or expert witness) and in doing so shall not be bound by any legal rules in relation to such matters". That is not a warrant to do as we like, since the Rule is circumscribed by the obligations identified by the Supreme Court in Borges v. Fitness to Practise Committee of the Medical Council (2004) 1IR 103. There Keane CJ said that a hearing of that committee is one where the accused practitioner, "is entitled to have the hearing conducted in accordance with fair procedures and natural justice. That is not to say that a body of this nature may not depart fromprocedures which would be essential in a court of law, as was made clear by this court in Kiely v. Minister for Social Welfare (1977) IR267: In particular, they may act on the basis of unsworn or hearsay evidence. But, as was also made clear in that case, their freedom from the constraints to which courts of law are subject does not permit them to act in a way which is inconsistent with the basic fairness of procedures guaranteed by implication by Article 40.3 of the Constitution".
Cognisant of our obligation to behave in accordance with that dictum, we proceed to consider whether we would be justified in acceding to the Respondents application to rule out the possibility of Mr Aspell giving evidence in the case, notwithstanding that the Respondents expressly accept that they do not suggest any impropriety or subjective bias on his part, but premise their application exclusively on the fact that as an employee of the IHRB, his evidence cannot be seen to be independent or unaffected by the exigencies of proceedings in which his employer has a direct interest. The argument of the Respondents is not dependent on the substance of his evidence or any subjective lack of independence on his part. It is based solely on the fact of him being an employee of the IHRB. Because of that fact, it is said that he cannot give expert evidence.
The Respondents contend that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Duffy v. McGee provides a basis for the making by them of this application.
The law in Ireland on this topic prior to the decision in Duffy v. McGee is explained in a consultation paper prepared by the Law Reform Commission on expert evidence (LRC CP 52/2008). The relevant paragraphs are 375 to 381. Paragraph 375 reads as follows.
"The Irish courts have held that a person is not entitled to give expert evidence where he or she is one of the parties to the case. However, it has been held on a number of occasions that a person can be called as an expert witness if they have a pre-existing relationship with one of the parties, for example if they are in their employment".
Paragraph 376 of the paper considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Galvin v. Murray (2000) IESC 78, which concerned disclosure obligations of an expert for the purpose of giving evidence. In the case, the County Council argued that the evidence given by an engineering firm who were employed by it was not covered by the discovery rules on expert testimony as the report of the engineers was submitted in their capacity as employees of the Council and not as experts. Murphy J. held that while the fact that the witness in question was employed or engaged by one of the parties may affect his independence, this should be taken into account when assessing the weight to be attached to his expert evidence and should not affect his status as an expert. In the course of his decision, he considered the English case of Shell Pensions v. Fell Frischmann, where it had been pointed out that the English rules pertaining to expert evidence, like the Irish rules, "refer to 'expert evidence', and not to evidence given by independent experts". In Shell, it was held that the rules relating to expert evidence, "apply generally to independent experts, to so called, 'in-house' experts and to parties themselves", which Murphy J. considered was the correct approach to adopt.
The Law Reform Commission paper also points out that the same approach was taken in Field v. Leeds City Council (1999) EWCA CIV 3013, where it was held that the mere fact of employment did not disqualify the employee from acting as an expert witness for his employer, as long as the employee was able to prove that he had the relevant expertise in an area in issue and that he was aware of his overriding duty to the court, not to his employer. However, it was stressed by May L.J. that the fact that the expert was in the employment of one of the parties may affect the weight to be afforded to his opinion.
The opposite view appears to have been taken in a later English case of Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trust v. Goldberg (2001) EW HCCH 396, where the court held inadmissible the evidence of an expert tendered on behalf of the defendant, due to the fact that the defendant had a close personal and professional relationship with the expert for several years. The court held that the expert should not be entitled to give evidence on public policy grounds, in that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done.
That approach was held to be incorrect by the Court of Appeal in R (Factortame and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport (2002) EWCA CIV 932, where the Master of the Rolls reasoned that such an approach would have the result of automatically excluding any employee from giving evidence on behalf of an employer. He held that while it is desirable that an expert witness have no actual or apparent interest in the outcome of the proceedings, such an interest is not an automatic reason for exclusion from giving expert evidence, thus re-establishing the earlier approach to admitting experts who have a pre-existing relationship with one of the parties. Thus the legal position up to Duffy v. McGee in Ireland has been the same as in England: namely, an expert's testimony is not to be excluded simply by virtue of the fact that the expert was in the employment of one of the parties to the litigation. But the contention which is now made is that the law in this jurisdiction has changed as a result of the Court of Appeal decision in Duffy v. McGee such as to justify the exclusion of Mr Aspell's testimony.
The first thing to note is that the judgment in Duffy v. McGee does not deal with the admissibility of evidence from an expert who is in the employment of one of the parties to the litigation. Secondly, nowhere in either the leading judgment of Noonan J. or the concurring judgment of Collins J. is any mention made of the Supreme Court decision in Galvin v. Murray.
Third, it is to be noticed that both judgments in the Court of Appeal express conclusions as to the potential inadmissibility of the expert's evidence by reference to the testimony actually given in the court of trial. His evidence was ruled out in its entirety by the trial judge but only after and not before it was tendered. His view was upheld on appeal. That was hardly a surprise, given the observations made by Noonan J. at paragraphs 102 to 104 of his judgment. At paragraph 102 he identifies nine different criticisms of the testimony given by the expert. At paragraph 103 he says this:
"Any one of these matters on its own would tend to strongly suggest an absence of objectivity and impartiality on the part of Dr. Thompson but taken in combination, can only be described as a wholesale abdication by Dr. Thompson of his duty as an expert witness. I share the trial judge's experience of never having encountered such an approach to giving evidence by an expert witness before our courts. Dr. Thompson impermissibly donned the mantle of a partisan advocate in his efforts to discredit the claim of the plaintiff's."
At paragraph 104, he said:
"It is simply not possible to adopt some kind of curate's egg approach to this evidence, as counsel for Mr McGee suggested, and I am satisfied that the trial judge was perfectly correct to exclude Dr. Thompson's evidence in its entirety. There was in this case such an abject failure to comply with the most basic obligation of an expert, namely, to be objective and impartial, as to render all of Dr. Thompson's evidence inadmissible."
That is a far cry from the position which obtains in this case.
Particular reliance is placed upon the concurring judgment of Collins J. in support of this application.
In common with Noonan J. he identified the essential requirements of an expert witness as being objectivity, impartiality and independence with a duty to the court or tribunal rather than to any party in the case. He said at paragraph 25, of the judgment:
"Any significant departure from the essential requirements of objectivity, impartiality, and independence must be taken very seriously. There was considerable debate here as to whether such matters went only to weight or whether a want of objectivity, impartiality or independence might reach the point where the evidence of an expert should be excludedaltogether. I have no hesitation in concluding – in agreement with Noonan J. - that, as a matter of principle, lack of objectivity, impartiality and independence may (and in an appropriate case will) go to the admissibility of expert evidence, not merely to the weight to be given to such evidence."
Heavy reliance was placed on this paragraph by the Respondents, but it must be borne in mind that the decision torender the evidence inadmissible in that case was taken at the conclusion of hearing the testimony and not by means of a form of pre-emptive strike to exclude the evidence before it was actually given.
In an earlier part of his judgment, Collins, J., considered the position that pertained in other jurisdictions, notably, for thepurpose of this decision, the federal courts in the United States, with particular reference to the decision of the UnitedStates Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell DowPharmaceuticals (1993) 509, U.S. 579. The principle established by that decision is one which enables the federal courts in the U.S. to exclude expert testimony in limine in relation to matters that do not have sufficient peer support or are not generally accepted within the wider scientific or technical community. Thus, the federal courts are conferred with what is described as a "gatekeeper" role in relation to some expert evidence, and they can simply refuse to hear it. But at paragraph 17 of his judgement in Duffy v. McGee, Collins J.makes it clear that that is not a feature of Irish law. He said:
"The position in this jurisdiction as regards the issue of reliability would therefore appear to be as follows. There is no general requirement that expert evidence must meet any specific threshold of reliability as a condition of admissibility, nor do the Irish courts have the 'gatekeeping' function contemplated by Daubert. However, in any given case, the admissibility of expert evidence may be challenged on the basis that it lacks a reliable scientific or methodologicalfoundation. At what stage of the proceedings, and in what manner, such a challenge should be determined is a matter for case by case assessment. Finally, even where admissible, issues of reliability may properly affect the weight to be given to expert evidence".
We do not read that decision as providing a basis for a refusal to allow Mr Aspell to give evidence.
First, the decision acknowledges that there is no "gatekeeper" jurisdiction in Irish law to make such an order, whatever may be the position in the federal courts of the United States. Second, any jurisdiction to regard expert testimony as inadmissible is one which falls to be exercised at the conclusion of the hearing of that evidence, and not beforehand. Third, the decision in Duffy v. McGee does not at all deal with the issue in this case, namely, the exclusion of Mr Aspell's evidence merely because he is an employee of the IHRB. Finally, as counsel for the Respondents fairly accepted, he was unable to cite a single case where an application of this sort had been made, still less successfully made to any court in this jurisdiction. In such circumstances it would not be appropriate for a body such as this to attempt to do so, nor indeed, would it be warranted.
For these reasons we declined to rule out in limine, the proposed testimony of Mr Aspell. We did, however, make it clear that in accordance with our obligations to conduct the hearing fairly and in accordance with the norms of constitutional justice, it would be perfectly open to counsel to test Mr Aspell's evidence in every respect in cross examination, including as to his objectivity. Thus, the weight to be given to his evidence, or even its admissibility, would be matters for consideration by us, but only having heard his evidence, and not beforehand. Accordingly, the application was refused.
Relevance and Hearsay
Prior to the hearing the IHRB gave notice that it intended to call evidence pertinent to betting patterns which occurred in respect of the race in question. That evidence was to have been given by a Mr Craske, a betting and racing analyst. But that position changed on the day of the hearing, and instead it was proposed that the evidence be given by a Mr Aidan Connolly, a representative of an entity called IDIRO. Two objections were made with a view to having this evidence excluded. First, it was said that it was of no relevance to the allegations made against the Respondents. Second, it was said that such evidence would be hearsay and therefore ought not to be admitted.
Counsel on behalf of the Respondents referred to the letter of charge served on the Respondents dated 14 October, 2025. Insofar as the charges against the jockey were concerned, the breach of Rule 212A was specified and particulars were then given. One of the particulars (included in the letter at paragraph 4 on the second page) read:
"The incident occurred in circumstances of significant, contemporaneous betting activity adverse to Redwood Queen and favourable to Beacon Edge, evidenced by market alerts, exchange partner data, and a pre-off surge against Redwood Queen".
Counsel then pointed to the actual allegation of breach of Rule 212, which contains no such allegation. However, the explanation for that is that the actual charge under Rule 212 does not purport to give the particulars, but merely the charge itself. Counsel contended that as there was no charge laid in respect of any interference or wrongful activity concerning betting, we ought not to allow such evidence to be given.
Whilst it is true that no specific charge is made in relation to wrongful activity on betting, that does not exclude the ability for evidence of such to be tendered in a case involving a breach of Rule 212. The reason for that is the very wording of Rule 212(c) (iii), which provides that in an appropriate circumstance, the Referrals Committee or the Appeals Body, "should take into account all relevant circumstances, and evidence in the conduct of any Steward's Enquiry, referral or appeal hearing under this rule, the following matters may be taken into account - ... (iii) Any evidence of betting patterns from which it may be reasonable to draw an inference concerning the advanced knowledge of persons connected with a horse, as to the likely performance of the horse concerned in a relevant race (including any previous race in which the horse concerned has run)."
That rule clearly authorises the taking of evidence of betting patterns in a case in which a breach of Rule 212 is alleged. Having regard to that specific provision, we took the view that we would not be justified in refusing to hear such evidence in limine, although we made it very clear that the weight to be attached to such evidence was a matter for consideration, having heard it in the light of the allegations and the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, an objection was made to the admissibility of this evidence because it was said it would be hearsay and ought to be ruled out for that reason.
As is clear from earlier in this ruling, particularly having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Borges, we are free from the constraints to which courts of law are subject (including a strict application of the rule against hearsay) but we must act in a way which is consistent with basic fairness of procedures guaranteed by implication by Article 40.3 of the Constitution. In fact, we are specifically authorised to decide on the admissibility, relevance and weight of any evidence and "in doing so, shall not be bound by any legal rules in relation to such matters." (See Rule 19A (vii)). Accordingly, we rejected this application to exclude the evidence, but again made it clear that the weight to be attached to it or its admissibility would be matters for consideration having heard the testimony.
It was for these reasons that we declined to accede to both of the preliminary applications made to exclude testimony.
Deliberate
We have already set forth the allegations made against the jockey. Each of the three charges contend that he deliberately left the saddle of the horse immediately after it jumped the final hurdle.
A deliberate act is one which is carried out consciously and intentionally. In other words, it is an act which is done on purpose.
If the IHRB is to be successful in this referral, it must demonstrate as a matter of probability that such is the case. It has sought to do so by calling five witnesses and placing before us extensive video and photographic evidence of the race taken from a wide variety of different angles and positions. One of the five witnesses, Mr Aspell, gave opinion evidence as an expert in support of the IHRB case.
We also heard evidence from the jockey and two experts, (Messrs Watson and Russell) who gave their opinion evidence in support of his plea of not guilty in respect of the allegations made. We have spent hours viewing and examining the video and photographic evidence in discharge of our task. We agree with what was said by counsel for the IHRB at the commencement of the hearing when he remarked, "it's a relatively net matter and I think the primary piece of evidence that you're going to receive is in fact going to be the footage of the race and the various different angles." We have, of course, taken into account all of the evidence tendered. But the primary evidence is the video and photographic material.
The Jockey
He is a professional jump jockey. He was granted a category A1 qualified rider's licence in 2019/2020. He subsequently obtained a category C licence in 2020/2021. He recorded 96 rides under qualified rider rules, with 13 wins, in addition to two point-to-point rides. On 6 August 2021 he was granted a National Hunt professional licence and has held it continuously since then. Over that period he accumulated in excess of 600 professional rides with 58 winners. He was familiar with the horse having ridden it on multiple occasions, and had regular dealings with it, as the trainer is his father. Indeed, it is his father who is his main supporter, with rides also being given to him by Mr Eddie Cawley and Mr William Durkan.
Of no little significance is the fact that the IHRB records indicate that the jockey's overall rate of falls and unseats is materially higher than the average for riders of similar experience, placing him within the upper band for such incidents. As was said in evidence by Mr Murtagh, "this is not conclusive of fault in any individual case, but highlights a pattern regarding stability and control in the saddle." The jockey admitted that he had, "some heavy falls and somesoft unseats, something I need to probably address, but I feel that's part of racing."
One of his previous falls had been particularly serious in that it resulted in him fracturing his T8 and T9 vertebrae, giving rise to a long period when he was unable to ride.
The Jockey's Account
The jockey accepted that he was familiar with the horse and had ridden her nine times and won on her on five occasions. He had also ridden her at home in the yard and so was very familiar with her. He said that prior to the race he'd had a conversation with the trainer and agreed that he'd sit second or third, get the horse into a nice rhythm and see how she went after that. It was then, "up to myself."
During the interview which was conducted in August 2025, when asked by Mr Murtagh as to why he parted company with the mare, the jockey said, "I don't know (inaudible). It felt like I just slipped off her backside. Next thing I was on the floor (inaudible). Next thing down (inaudible) floor, I was on the floor." Later in the interview he was pressed on that issue again and he said, "I went to the last... Got a bit short at it. Just miscommunication between horse and rider. She came up underneath me, caught me on the backside, and I came off."
Later when questioned as to whether he made any effort to stay on he said that he made every effort but, "once I got that bump the balance is gone, like. Next thing I knew I was on the floor. So, that's how it went." He also admitted in that interview that he lost both stirrups, a fact which was clearly demonstrated in the video and photographic evidence. Later in that interview he again asserted that he received a bump from the horse when she took off and said that he would ride with his knees out a small bit going behind and that that was his style of riding, a fact also confirmed on the video. The video also showed that he has only his toes in the irons and not his full feet. Later in the interview he again spoke about getting the bump from the horse and asserted that he did indeed try to stay on but failed.
Two further matters of note arise from that interview. First, the jockey admitted that he was deeply embarrassed by what happened, and second that he had no knowledge of the betting on the day or what was described as "significant market movement."
The Jockey's Evidence to this Committee
The jockey gave evidence before us. Much of what he had to say concerning him receiving a bump in the backside as the horse jumped the hurdle thereby causing him to lose balance in circumstances where he had lost his irons, was fairly consistent with what he had said at the interview in August 2025. There were of course some differences. In particular, he theorised that the horse had been distracted and was looking in field at the time of the jump. That was never mentioned by him at the interview in August 2025. He admitted that he didn't have a recollection of that happening during the race but came to that conclusion on viewing video evidence at some stage subsequent thereto. He admitted that if the horse had actually been distracted, he would have told the interviewers in August. In fact, he only told his father about this two weeks before the hearing and never told Mr Watson, one of his experts.
Despite that unsatisfactory element he was nonetheless consistent throughout all his testimony that whilst airborne the horse made contact with his backside, thereby causing him to lose balance and to fall. More to the point, however, is the fact that in our view, that account is borne out by the video and photographic evidence which we have examined exhaustively.
Was the fall deliberate?
As already pointed out, the obligation is on the IHRB to satisfy us by evidence that the fall in question was deliberate if it is to succeed with this complaint.
We have come to the conclusion that it has not discharged that burden of proof. In so concluding we have had regard primarily to the video and photographic evidence and our assessment of the evidence given to us by the jockey. We have not had to have much reliance on the evidence given by the experts.
What is clear to us is that as a result of the way the horse jumped the hurdle, she bumped the backside of the jockey, sending him over so slightly to the left which resulted in him losing the right stirrup in the first instance followed by the left and he was duly unseated from the horse. We do not believe that this was a deliberate act on his part. He was fortunate in the way in which he landed and that he suffered no injuries.
We are unable to identify any motivation to justify him deliberately dismounting from the horse. We accept what was said by Mr Russell to the effect that jumping off can give rise to the worst type of fall and that the general rule is that one does not bail out for fear of the injury that might ensue. Had the fall been deliberate, we believe the jockey would be fully aware of the embarrassment that that would be to him, and the consequences for his reputation as a jockey. We also dismiss any suggestion that betting or betting patterns formed a motivation for the fall. We found the jockey's evidence on this element convincing, and the betting pattern evidence which was furnished to us to be unsatisfactory and unconvincing.
Conclusion
The IHRB complaint of deliberate conduct on the part of the jockey is not made out. We are of opinion that what occurred on this occasion was an example of poor horsemanship on the part of the jockey, consistent with his pre-existing poor falls record. In our opinion on the occasion in question the jockey's position of instability stemmed from an exuberant jump by the horse, resulting in the loss of both irons consecutively. His effort to remain on board by holding onto the reins and neck strap was unsuccessful.
Expert Testimony
The primary purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact (in this case this Referral Committee) in understanding evidence or determining facts that fall outside of ordinary knowledge. The expert's duty is to provide objective and unbiased assistance which supersedes any obligation to the party employing them or paying their fees. The principles governing the approach to be taken to expert evidence has recently been restated in the Duffy v. McGee case. That decision makes it clear that an expert witness is there to assist the court, not to decide the case, and the court has no obligation to accept the evidence of any particular expert, even where it is uncontradicted.
In the present case it was possible for us to reach our decision by reference to the primary evidence made available by first class photographic and video evidence. There was therefore little need to place any reliance on the expert testimony tendered save in the few minor areas which have been identified earlier in this decision. It is therefore not necessary for us to express a preference for the views of one expert over another given the photographic and video evidence and the knowledge and experience of this Committee.
Before moving to a consideration of the complaint made against the trainer, we wish to say that when we first saw the ordinary video coverage of the incident, we were inclined to the view that the jockey's fall was indeed very suspect and appeared deliberate and contrived. However, having had the advantage of hearing all of the testimony, and examining minutely, and in great detail, and from a variety of angles, all of the video and photographic evidence, we have come to the conclusion that such was not the case. We have had a considerable advantage over numerous pundits and commentators, who appear to have been quick to rush to judgment adverse to the jockey. Such conclusions were unfair to him.
The IHRB was perfectly justified in conducting the investigation subsequent to the race and in bringing the case to this Committee. The fact that it has not succeeded is not in any way a reflection on the propriety of making the referral and there is no evidence that it was made other than for a proper purpose.
Having made these observations, we now turn to the charge laid against the trainer.
The Trainer's Charge
We have already set out the allegation made against the trainer. It is not denied that he made the statement to the Irish Field newspaper published on 30 May 2025. The allegation is that statement was prejudicial to the integrity, proper or good reputation of horse racing because, it is said, it sought to undermine the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the running of the horse and the race by suggesting that there was no real basis for the investigation or that it was being conducted for an improper purpose.
It is important to have regard to what was actually said by the trainer. He said, "it's a sad day if the Turf Club has to hold an investigation to please the faceless people on social media. We will answer any questions they have. We have nothing to answer to."
The penultimate sentence from the quotation was correct. It is accepted by the IHRB that there was full cooperation with the investigation carried out by it, which included the answering of questions.
The final sentence is correct insofar as the trainer is concerned. No charges were laid against him concerning the running and riding in the race. His only charge arises as a result of the making of the statement. So at the time the statement was made, it was correct.
The real sting is to be found in the first sentence. However, it is important to bear in mind that he did not allege that the IHRB was holding an investigation to please the faceless people on social media. Had he done so, then we are of opinion that the allegation made against the trainer would be made out. What he in fact did was to make a comment to the effect that it's a sad day if the Turf Club had to hold an investigation to please the faceless people on social media.
The trainer is entitled to be tried in respect of the actual words used by him, which fall short of an allegation of improper motive on the part of IHRB.
Given that no such allegation was actually made, but that the sentence amounts to conjecture, we are of the view that the case against him is not made out. We are far from satisfied that it was either wise or prudent to make the statement at all, but in our view it fell short of the breach of the Rule alleged.
Disposal
For the reasons stated above, all charges against both respondents are dismissed.